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the specific conditions required by the board and the commission is a matter of record with those agencies. In effect,
the motion of the board, and the confirming letter of the
commission, constituted an offer to grant an exception which
was not accepted. By its terms, the exception was ineffective
if its conditions were not met.
I would, therefore, affirm the portions of the judgment
from which the appeal is taken.
Carter, J., and Schauer, J., concurred.
Respondents' petition for a rehearing was denied May 14,
1853. Edmonds, J., Carter, ,J., and Schauer, J., were of
the opinion that the petition should be granted.

[S. F. No. 18616.

In Bank.
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HAWAIIAN PINEAPPLE COMPANY, LTD. (a Corporation), Petitioner, v. INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT COMMISSION and KENNETH CHURCHILL, Respondents.
[1] Workmen's Compensation-Findings.-It is for the Industrial Accident Commission, not a referee, to make the findings in a compensation case. (Lab. Code, § 5953.)
[2] !d.-Compensable Injuries-Wilful Misconduct.-"Serious and
wilful misconduct" of employer warranting increased compensation under Lab. Code, § 4553, denotes a greater degree
of culpability than mere negligent or even grossly negligent
conduct.
[3] Negligence-"Wilfulness."-"Wilful" conduct, as opposed to
negligent conduct, involves at least an intention to perform
an act or omission with actual knowledge, or that which in
law is deemed to be the equivalent of actual knowledge of
the peril to be apprehended from the act or omission.
[2] Serious and wilful misconduct of employer warranting increased compensation, or action at law, notes, 16 A.L.R. 620; 58
A.L.R. 1379. See, also, Cal.Jur., Workmen's Compensation, § 118;
Am.Jur., vVorkmen's Compensation, § 54.
[3] See Cal.Jur., Negligence, § 8; Am.Jur., Negligence, § 48.
McK. Dig. References: [1, 7, 8, 10] Workmen's Compensation,
§ 190; [2] Workmen's Compensation, § 123; [3, 4] Negligence, § 8;
[5, 6, 9] Workmen's Compensation, § 124; [11] Workmen's Compensation,§§ 118, 123; [12] Workmen's Compensation,§ 272(6).
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[4] Id.-"Wilfulness."-While gross negligence may involve an
intent to perform an act or omission, wilful misconduct involves the further intent that the performance be harmful
or that it be done with a positive, active and absolute disregard of the consequences.
[5] Workmen's Compensation-Compensable Injuries-Wilful Misconduct.-"Serious and wilful misconduct" as that expression is used in Lab. Code, § 4553, cannot be established by
showing acts any less culpable, any less deliberate, or any
less knowing or intentional, than is required to prove wilful
misconduct.
[6] !d.-Compensable Injuries-Wilful Misconduct.-Serious and
wilful misconduct is basically the antithesis of negligence, and
the two types of behavior are mutually exclusive; an act
which is merely negligent and consequently devoid of either
an intention to do harm or of knowledge or appreciation of
the fact that danger is likely to result therefrom cannot at
the same time constitute wilful misconduct.
[7] Id.- Findings- Wilful Misconduct.- Findings of Industrial
Accident Commission that employer failed to "provide and
maintain proper and adequate safety devices" or to employ
means "reasonably adequate to render applicant's employment
and place of employment safe" are insufficient to show that
employer's misconduct was serious and wilful, since they constitute nothing more than findings of negligence.
[8] !d.-Findings-Wilful Misconduct.-While findings of Industrial Accident Commission that certain conduct of employer
"evinced a reckless disregard for the safety of . . . employee"
and that employer "knew or should have known had he put
his mind to it that such failure or omission was likely to
result in serious injury" closely approach those factual elements necessary to determine that employer's misconduct was
serious and wilful, the conduct must be with knowledge of
the peril to be apprehended, or done with a positive and
active disregard of the consequences.
[9] !d.-Compensable Injuries-Wilful Misconduct.-A "reckless
disregard" of the safety of employees is not sufficient in
itself to constitute serious and wilful misconduct unless the
evidence shows that the disregard was more culpable than
a careless or even a grossly careless omission or act.
[10] !d.-Findings-Wilful Misconduct.-A finding that the "employer knew or should have known had he put his mind to
it" does not constitute a finding that the employer had that
degree of knowledge of the consequences of his act that
would make his conduct wilful; the standard requires an act
or omission to which the employer has "put his mind."
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[11] !d.-Compensable Injuries-Wilful Misconduct.-The words
"serious and wilful misconduct" must be given the same meaning whether they apply to an employer under Lab. Code,
§ 4553, or to an employee under Lab. Code, § 4551.
[12] !d.-Certiorari-Review of Findings-Wilful Misconduct.While findings must be interpreted liberally in favor of sustaining an award by the Industrial Accident Commission of
additional compensation to an employee, even if reference to
the record is required, where the record is devoid of any substantial evidence that the employer intended to do harm, or
that it had knowledge of the probable consequences of its
failure to provide more adequate safety devices or a safer
place to work or that it exercised an affirmative and knowing disregard for the safety of the injured employee, and
where, notwithstanding evidence that a similar accident was
closely avoided shortly before the injury here complained
of, the employer thereafter took steps to remove this hazard
but there is no evidence that the employer had knowledge
that this remedy was inadequate or that it had any reason
to believe that the circumstances which nearly caused a first
accident continued to exist, an award of additional compensation for serious and wilful misconduct will be annulled.

PROCEEDING to review an award by the Industrial Accident Commissibn of additional compensation to injured employee for serious and wilful misconduct of employer. Award
annulled.
Brbbeck, Phleger & Harrison and Rinaldo Sciaroni, Jr.,
for Petitioner.
Edmund J. 'l'homas, Jr., Leonard M. Levy, Alvin L. Dove,
Johnson, Morgan, Thorne, Speed & Bamford and Robert
Morgan for Respondents.
SHENK, ,J.-This is a proceeding in review to annul an
award by the Industrial Accident Commission of additional
compensation to Kenneth Churchill, an employee of the petitioner, pursuant to the provisions of Labor Code, section 4553.
An award of normal compensation is not contested. The
award of $15 per week additional compensation was based
upon a finding that an industrial injury suffered by the employee was caused by the "serious and wilful misconduct"
of the employer.
The employee operated a fork lift truck at the employer's
cannery in San Jose. Switch tracks used by the Southern
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Pacific Company ran between the plant and an associated
warehouse, making it necessary for lift drivers when returning from the warehouse to drive out of a doorway in the warebouse down a short ramp, across two sets of switch tracks,
up a short ramp and through a doorway into the main plant.
A third set of tracks, used to "spot" freight cars alongside
the warehouse, lay between the switch tracks and the warehouse but did not extend through the ramp, being blocked
off on both sides of the ramp.
At noon in May, 1950, the employee Churchill drove out
of the warehouse doorway onto the ramp as a switch engine
approached on his right. He did not stop his truck. Manually
operated blinker lights over the doorway had not been turned
on. The employee testified that he looked into a mirror reflecting a view of the tracks but that he could see only as
far as the second of two boxcars which were spotted alongside the warehouse wall adjacent to the ramp on his right,
and that the switch tracks were clear as far as he could see.
There was evidence also that the boxcars shut off the view
by the train crew of the fork lift truck coming out of the doorway until it was practically on the track and about 11
feet from the engine. The employee testified that he too first
became aware of the engine at this point; that he speeded
his motor to get across the tracks ahead of the engine, but
his truck was struck in the back end and upset, causing the
injuries for which the contested award was made.
Prior to and on the day of the accident there were approximately 15 fork lift trucks in operation throughout the plant.
Four of these trucks were continuously making crossings between the warehouse and the main plant. The injured employee testified that he alone had made between 20 and 50
crossing·s the morning of the accident. There was evidence
that the switching engine passed the crossing on an average
of four times a day during the period immediately prior to
the accident.
The employer lJad taken precautions to prevent the occurrence of accidents at the crossing. Over the middle of each
doorway there was placed a sign with crossed white lines
and the letters '' R R'' on them. In addition stop signs were
posted at each doorway. Prior to the accident and following
a near accident to another lift truck driver a mirror 17 by 21
inches in size was installed on the wall of the main plant
opposite the doorway in the warehouse and approximately
50 feet distant therefrom, and placed in such a position that

660

HAWAIIAN PINEAPPLE Co. v. IND. Ace. CoM.

[40 C.2d

it reflected a view of the switch tracks to a fork lift driver
leaving the warehouse. 'rhere was evidence that the view
down the tracks afforded by the mirror was limited in some
instances to no more than 20 feet, depending on the position
at which one left the warehouse doorway.
It was conceded that the employer had an "energetic safety
program" and that the employer's safety committee had been
instrumental in promulgating various safety rules, including
one which required that fork lift operators stop their trucks
before crossing the tracks. The drivers, including the injured
employee, had been furnished copies of the safety rules and
had occasionally been warned of the failure of drivers to stop
at the crossing or of driving their trucks at top speed which
varied from three to five miles per hour. However, there
was evidence that for an indefinite period immediately prior
to the accident the drivers had not complied with the rule
requiring them to stop, despite the warnings. 'fheir failure to
comply with the warnings was attributed by the drivers to
the fact that their work load, even in the slack season, required
that they hurry.
In accordance with a recommendation of the employer's
safety committee made in 1947 or 1948, the employer had
placed a watchman at the crossing during the so-called
"operating season" at the plant, July through October of
eaeh year. 'l'he watchman acted as a lookout and gave a
warning of approaching trains. One of his duties was to pull
a manually operated switch which started blinker stop lights
above the doorways when a train was coming. During the
slack season when the accident occurred no watchman was
employed, and no one was assigned the duty of sounding an
alarm of an approaching switch engine. There was evidence
that during the sl11ck season the blinker lights were either not
operated when a switch engine approached, or were operated
by ''anybody who happened to come along.''
Although an approaching engine on all occasions rang a
bell, the fork lift operators could not clearly hear it because
the motor directly below the seat on the fork lift was noisy.
'l'he crew of the switch engine did not provide a flagman nor
at any time did a member of the crew operate the manually
controlled blinker lights in the doorways.
The injured employee filed a claim before the commission
wherein additional compensation was sought under section
4553 of the Labor Code. That section :Provides that the
amount of compensation otherwise recoverable shall be in-
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creased one-half where the employee was injured by reason
of the "serious and wilful misconduct" of his employer. The
commission found that the employer ''failed or omitted to
provide and maintain proper and adequate safety devices
to warn of the approach of switch engines along said railroad
right of way or to adopt and nse means, methods, operations
and processes reasonably adequate to render applicant's employment and place of employment safe . . . . " It was dett>rmined that the injury to the employee "was caused by the
misconduct of the employer" and that the misconduct was
"serious and wilful." 'l'he referee had found on the same
facts that the injury was caused by the applicant's own ''careless disregard of the hazard of the right of way crossing"
and that the conduct of the employer did not "constitute a
reckless disregard of the safety of others and a willingness
to inflict the injury complained of," citing E. Clemens Horst
Co. v. Industrial Ace. Com., 184 Cal. 180 [193 P. 105, 16
.A.I-1.R. 611]. [1] However, it is for the commission, not
the referee, to make the :findings. (Lab. Code, § 5953; Liberty
M1lfttal Ins. Co. v. Industrial Ace. Com., 33 Cal.2d 89, 92
[199 P.2d 302] .) The questions presented relate to the sufficiency of the evidence to support the findings of the commission and to the conclusions of the commission as to serious
anrl wilful misconduct.
In support of the commission's findings there was substantial evidence that the fork lift drivers crossed the tracks
scores of times a day; that the fact that they failed to make
tl1e required stop at each crossing was condoned by the emplorer and made necessary by the work load; that both the
view of the drivers and that of the railroad crew were limited
by the location of the tracks with respect to the doorways
and the spotting of freight cars near the doorways; that the
sizt> of tht> mirror together with the distances involved did
not give a clear view of the tracks for a sufficiently safe distancP; that dnring the slack season the blinker light was
lmrf'liable, and served as much as a trap as it did as a protection, for tl1e reason that it was operated only by the chance
of someone 's being present when a train approached; that the
danger to which the fork lift drivers were exposed could
have been eliminated, as it was in the "operating season"
by the use of a watchman, or by automatic signal, and that
the employer had been so informed by one of the drivers following a near accident of the same nature as the one here
involved.
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The commission was called upon to apply to its findings of fact a recognized standard of conduct in order that
it could further find whether the employer had failed to
maintain that standard. Although this inquiry involves questions of fact, the standard itself is a matter of law. The
statute defines the standard as one which requires an employer to abstain from ''serious and wilful misconduct,''
which expression has often been the subject of judicial interpretation by our courts. In our recent decision, MercerFraser Co. v. Industria~ Ace. Com., ante, p. 102 [251 P.2d
955], this problem was considered at length. [2] It was
held that "serious and wilful misconduct" denotes a greater
degree of culpability than mere negligent or even grossly
negligent conduct. It was pointed out that the additional
award was actually in the nature of a penalty; that it cannot be insured against; and that its imposition upon evidence of conduct any less culpable than that specified by the
i'itatute would constitute an unlawful taking of the property
of one person for the benefit of another. In arriving at the
legislative intent in phrasing the statute other decisions were
considered which had attached meanings to the following
similar terms, many employing the element of wilfulness :
"wilful and wanton negligence," "wilful negligence," "wanton and wilful misconduct," "wanton and reckless misconduct," "wilful misconduct" all as used in tort actions (Donnelly v. Southern Pac. Co. (1941), 18 Cal.2d 863, 869 [118
P.2d 465]) ; "wilful misconduct" as used in the so-called
guest statute, Vehicle Code, section 403 (Porter v. Hofman
(1938), 12 Cal.2d 445, 447 [85 P.2d 447]; Meek v. Fowler
( 1935), 3 Cal.2d 420, 425 [45 P .2d 194] ; H owar·d v. H award
(1933), 132 Cal.App. 124 [22 P.2d 279] ). [3] These cases
all held that where conduct was described as "wilful" as opposed to negligent conduct in any degree, it involves at least
an intention to perform an act or omission with actual
knowledge, or that which in law is deemed to be the equivalent of actual knowledge of the peril to be apprehended from
the act or omission. [4] While gross negligence may involve an intent to perform the act or omission, wilful misconduct involves the further intent that the performance be
harmful or that it be done with a positive, active and absolute disregard of the consequences. (Meek v. Fowler (1935),
supra, 3 Cal.2d 420, 425-426.) [5] It was concluded in the
Mercer-Fraser case that "serious and wilful misconduct" as
that expression is used in section 4553 of the Labor Code
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''cannot be established by showing acts any less culpable,
any less deliberate, or any less knowing or intentional, than
is required to prove wilful misconduct." (6] It was stated
in that case that ''the true rule is that serious and wilful
misconduct is basically the antithesis of negligence, and that
the two types of behavior are mutually exclusive; an act
which is merely negligent and consequently devoid of either
an intention to do harm or of knowledge or appreciation of
the fact that danger is likely to result therefrom cannot at
the same time constitute wilful misconduct. . . . ''
In the present case it must be determined whether the
commission has applied the standard set forth in the MercerFraser case in determining that the employer's misconduct
was "serious and wilful." It was held in that case that
the findings with regard to the conduct of the employer
constituted nothing more than findings of negligence. [7] The
same is manifestly true with regard to the findings in the
present case previously set out to the effect that the employer failed to ''provide and maintain proper and adequate safety devices" or to employ means "reasonably adequate to render applicant's employment and place of employment safe." [8] However, further findings to the effect that this conduct ''evinced a reckless disregard for the
safety of said employee" and that the employer "knew or
should have known had he put his mind to it that such failure
or omission was likely to result in serious injury'' more
closely approach those factual elements necessary to determine that the employer's misconduct was "serious and
wilful.'' Nevertheless, as stated, the conduct must be
with knowledge of the peril to be apprehended, or done with
a positive and active disregard of the consequences. (9] A
"reckless disregard" of the safety· of employees is not sufficient in itself unless the evidence shows that the disregard
was more culpable than a careless or even a grossly careless
omission or act. It must be an affirmative and knowing disregard of the consequences. (10] Likewise, a finding that
the "employer knew or should have known had he put his
mind to it'' does not constitute a finding that the employer
had that degree of knowledge of the consequences of his act
that would make his conduct wilful. The standard requires
an act or omission to which the employer has ''put his mind.''
(Mercer-Fraser Co. v. Industrial Ace. Com., supra, an,te, pp.
102, 124.) The evidence and the findings of the com-
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mission do not show that the employer had the knowledge
of the consequences of itR act or omission necessary to make
the performance of that act or omission a wilful one.
In considering the findings of the commission as a whole
and in the light of the fact that the only relevancy individual findings have to the issues presented in the present
case is in regard to whether the employer is liable for additional compensation, it is apparent that the commission has
imposed upon the employer a standard much stricter than
that authorized by law. Because the specific findings of the
commission fall short of what was defined as serious and wilful misconduct in the Mercer-Fraser case it must be concluded that the commission was in error in regard to the
proper standard.
It is significant that the statute works both ways-hence
the importance of correctly defining its terms. [11] While
section 4553 provides for an additional one-half of the normal compensation where the employer's "serious and wilful
misconduct" causes the injury, section 4551 provides that
''Where the injury is caused by the serious and wilful misconduct of the injured employee, the compensation otherwise
recoverable therefor shall be reduced one-half. . . . '' The
words ''serious and wilful misconduct'' must be given the same
meaning in each section. (Parkhurst v. Industrial Ace. Com.
(1942), 20 Cal.2d 826, 831 [129 P.2d 113]; E. Clemens Horst
Co. v. Industrial Ace. Com. (1920), supra, 184 Cal. 180, 188.)
It was suggested in the Mercer-Fraser case that in determining whether an employer's misconduct would justify increasing an award it would be significant to determine first whether
that same misconduct would justify reducing an award made
to the one responsible for the misconduct were he the injured party.
[12] We are not unmindful of the rule requiring that findings be interpreted liberally in favor of sustaining an
award, even where reference to the record is required.
Looking at the record it is devoid of any substantial evidence that the employer intended to do harm, or that it
had actual knowledge of the probable consequences of its
failure to provide more adequate safety devices or a safer
place to work or that it exercised an affirmative and knowing disregard for the safety of the injured employee. There
is evidence that a similar accident was closely avoided shortly
before the injury here complained of. It is true that at
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least a constructive knowledge could have been imputed to
the employer at that time that such an accident might occur
again. However, the employer thereafter took steps to remove this hazard. There is no evidence that the employer
had knowledge of any kind that this remedy was inadequate,
nor does the record reveal that there was any reason for it
to believe that the circumstances which nearly caused a first
accident continued to exist.
The present action does not involve the employer's violation of an express statute or commission safety order designed to protect employees. The rules laid down in such
cases (see Bethlehem Steel Go. v. Industrial Ace. Com., 23
Cal.2d 659 [145 P.2d 583] ; Parkhurst v. Industrial Ace. Com.,
supra, 20 Cal.2d 826; Blue Diamond Plaster Go. v. Industrial
Ace. Com., 188 Cal. 403 [205 P. 678]) as to what constitutes "serious and wilful misconduct" therefore have no
application.
The award of additional compensation is annulled.
Gibson, C. J., Edmonds, J., Traynor, J., Schauer, J., and
Spence, J., concurred.
CARTER, J.-I dissent.
By its decision here the majority has completed the reactionary process, commenced by its decision in California
Shipbuilding Gor·p. v. Ind1rstrial Ace. Com., 31 Cal.2d 278
f 188 P.2cl 32), and carried forward by its decisions in MercerFr·aser Go. v. Industr-ial Ace. Com., ante, p. 102 [251 P.2d
955] and Sutter· Butte Canal Go. v. Industr-ial Ace. Com.,
ante, p. 139 [251 P.2d 975], of judicial repeal of the workmen's compensation law that an award shall be increased for
wilful misconduct of the employer. (Lab. Code, § 4553.) I
reiterate what I said in my dissents in those cases. The lethal
blow has now been struck and section 4553 of the Labor Code
l1as ht'en nullified and stricken from the statute book by
judicial interpretation. By these decisions this court has
blotted out four decades of progress in the field of social
legislation for the benefit of the working men and women
of this state, and overruled numerous decisions of this court
and the District Court of Appeal without even mentioning
them.
The majority opinion holds that neither the findings nor
the evidence establishes serious and wilful misconduct.
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·with reference to the findings, they are clearly sufficient
under the authorities cited in my dissent in Mercer-Fraser
Co. v. Indnstr1:az Ace. Com., st£pra, ante, p. 129. They expressly state that the general superintendent of the employer
knew that his failure to provide safety devices was likely
to result in serious injury. ·while it is also found that he
should have had that knowledge, that in no way detracts from
the finding of actual knowledge.
Briefly, the facts are that the employer maintained an extremely dangerous condition of its property, that is, a railway
crossing which must be crossed by its employees, and had taken
no steps to protect the employees against that peril. I say
it took no steps because the evidence shows that the steps it
did take were so completely ineffectual as to be no protection
whatsoever. Moreover, one of the steps taken, the presence
of the signal light to warn of an approaching train, went beyond being ineffectual; it operated as a pitfall and trap for
the employees inasmuch as it was operated sometimes and
not others. All these conditions the employer knew of, yet
it did nothing to correct them.
A witness, Amaro, testified that three days before the
applicant employee was injured, he was engaged in the same
work, and while driving a lift truck across the railroad
tracks, barely escaped being struck by a train. He told
Spiegel, the employer's representative in charge, of his near
injury and that the signal light should be fixed so as to turn
on automatically when a train was approaching because ''yon
couldn't see the train when you came out of the door" to
cross the tracks, that is, in effect, that none of the employer's
devices served to safeguard against the peril; that a watchman or flagman should be put on the crossing. A mirror was
placed by the employer at the door the same day of Amaro's
near injury purportedly to give an operator of the lift truck
a view of approaching trains but it only gave a view 20 feet
clown the tracks. He saw the employer's superintendent at
the crossing after the signal lights were installed and it may
be inferred that the latter knew that they operated only
sporadically when someone happened to operate them. It
was not c~stomary for the truck drivers to stop at the crossing
because their work load was heavy. This was also known to
the superintendent.
A representative of the employer testified he knew there
was a train operating on the crossing at the time of the accident and that no one was operating the stop lights.
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Smnnl<Jri~in\?:. tl11' ('viihmee shows that Jher-e was h0rc a very
dangerous railroad (~rossing that !Ill 1St be contin11ally traversed
by the employec•s. lts danger IYas apparent to anyone from

a view of the physical facts. 'l'he employer knew of that
tlanger prior to the accident because it had placed lights to
signal the approach of a train and had a man to operate them
d ur1ug the busier times aml because its superintendent was
specifkally advised by an employee, who had a ''close call,''
of the danger aucl that none of the devices gave effective protection. Jn the face of that knowledge the employer failed
to do anything about it-permitted its employees to bear the
risk of this very real hazard. Certainly it is wholly reasonable to draw an inference that its conduct was in reckless disregard of its employees' welfare. Indeed, its conduct amounts
to intentionally subjecting its employees to injury, and this
condition was permitted to exist solely because protection
would cost the employer money. In the face of the foregoing
facts which the record di8closes without contradiction, the
majority opinion states: ''The evidence and the findings of the
eommission do not shmv that the employer had the knowledge
of the consequences of its act or omission necessary to make
the performance of that act or omission a wilful one. . . .
Looking at the record it is devoid of any substantial evidence
that the employer intended to do harm, or that it had actual
knowledge of the probable consequences of its failure to provide more adequate safety devices or a safer place to work
or that it exercised an affirmative and knowing disregard for
the safety of the injured employee.'' I cannot reconcile the
foregoing statements with an honest analysis of the record in
this case. It is undi8puted that during the so-called busy
season, the employer maintained a watchman at the crossing
to guard against such accidents as the one here involved. The
employer, therefore, knew that the crossing ·was a dangerous
oae and that safety measures must be taken to guard against
accidents of this character. 'l'he only satisfactory safety
measure which had been employed was the maintenance of a
watchman or an employee to manually operate the blinker
lights. 'l'his safety measure was abandoned by the employer
during the nonbnsy season although the risk was just as great
to the employee during the nonbusy season as during the busy
season. In the face of this factual background may it be said
·with the slightest regard for the truth, that "The evidence
and the findings of the commission do not show that the employer had the knowledge of the consequences of its act or
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omission necessary to make the performance of that act or
omission a wilful one," or that "the record is devoid of any
substantial evidence that the employer . . . had actual knowledge of the probable consequences of its failure to provide
more adequate safety devices or a safer place to work or that
it exercised an affirmative and knowing· disregard for the
safety of the injured employee.''
I am constrained to repeat a statement hereinabove made,
that the only reason this hazardous condition was permitted
to exist was solely because the maintenance of an adequate
safety measure would cost the employer money. The Legislature by its enactment of section 4553 of the Labor Code
sought to correct this evil, but the majority of this court,
solicitous only of the financial welfare of the employer, says
no, it is too great a burden for the employer to bear. So
we are back where we were 40 years ago so far as the enforcement of safety regulations is concerned.
It is the old story of the will of the people and the Legislature being defeated by reactionary court decisions. To
protect employees against unnecessary risks, the Legislature
enacts a law providing that an employer must provide a safe
place for his employees to perform their work, and that failure
to do so constitutes wilful misconduct on the part of the employer entitling an employee injured thereby to an increased
award of compensation. Obviously such a law tends to
create increased vigilance on the part of employers to provide safety devices and thus reduce the number of industrial
mJuries. There can be no doubt that the present law has
had a salutary effect. Its nullification by this court is not
only a travesty on social justice but an insidious abuse of
judicial power.
I would affirm the award here made.
Respondents' petition for a rehearing was denied May 7,
1953. Carter, ,J., was of the opinion that the petition shonld
he granted.

